Global borderlands: A case study of Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines by Reyes, Victoria
Bryn Mawr College
Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr
College
Growth and Structure of Cities Faculty Research
and Scholarship Growth and Structure of Cities
2015
Global borderlands: A case study of Subic Bay
Freeport Zone, Philippines
Victoria Reyes
Bryn Mawr College, vreyes@brynmawr.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.brynmawr.edu/cities_pubs
This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. http://repository.brynmawr.edu/cities_pubs/33
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.
Custom Citation
Reyes, Victoria. 2015. “Global borderlands: A case study of Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines” Theory and Society 44(4):355-384
Global borderlands 
 1
So Title: “Global borderlands: A case study of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines” 
 
Abstract:  
By developing the concept of “global borderlands”–semi-autonomous, foreign-
controlled geographic locations geared toward international exchange–this article shifts 
the focus of globalization literature from elite global cities and cities on national borders 
to within-country sites owned and/or operated by foreigners and defined by significant 
social, cultural, and economic exchange. I analyze three shared features of these sites: 
semi-autonomy, symbolic and geographic boundaries, and unequal relations. The multi-
method analyses reveal how the concept of global borderlands can help us better 
understand the interactions that occur in the contemporary era of globalization across 
people of different nationalities, classes, and races/ethnicities as well as the complex 
dynamics that occur within foreign-controlled spaces. I first situate global borderlands 
within the literatures of global cities and traditional borderlands. Next, I use the case 
study of Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ), Philippines to show (1) how the semi-
autonomy of global borderlands produces different regulations depending on nationality, 
(2) how its geographic and symbolic borders differentiate this space from the surrounding 
community, and (3) how the semi-autonomy of these locations and their geographic and 
symbolic borders reproduce unequal relations. As home of the former U.S. Subic Bay 
Naval Base and current site of a Freeport Zone, the SBFZ serves as a particularly 
strategic research location to examine the different forms of interactions that occur 
between groups within spaces of unequal power.  
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Since the 1970s, global inequality has dramatically increased. A geography of 
power separates the handful of rich societies from the large number of poor ones, 
(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009; Firebaugh 2003).1 Although this division is not new and 
dates back to before the “age of empire” (Hobsbawm 1989), the current era of 
globalization, by increasing in the speed and intensity of transactions, has arguably 
transformed economic, political, and cultural relationships. Scholarship on global 
inequality often takes an elite-centered view that focuses on the actors (nation-states, 
cities, organizations, or groups) that are able to shape the global political economy, and 
on the distribution of important cities nationally and internationally (Neal 2010; Smith 
and Timberlake 2001). Such scholarship, which emphasizes the concentration and 
distribution of goods and services, has been theorized through the lens of cities (Sassen 
2001 [1991]; Castells 1989; Friedmann 1986), as well as dependency and world-systems 
perspectives (Frank 1973; Prebisch 1959; Singer 1949; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; 
Wallerstein 2004). By definition, these approaches ignore sites of significant international 
or intercultural exchange and interaction that occur outside these elite spaces.  
In contrast, scholarship on frontiers, borders, and borderlands recognizes how 
inequalities are reproduced in places that cross international or intercultural boundaries 
(Alvarez 1995; Donnan and Wilson 1999). However, we know surprisingly little about 
how inequalities are maintained and reproduced in spaces that are based on cultural, 
social, and economic interactions beyond these particular locales and those that occur 
within foreign-controlled spaces. Examining unequal interactions–namely, those among 
foreign visitors, local visitors, and local workers in institutionalized, semi-autonomous 
                                                 
1
 I am aware of the disputes regarding whether it is within- or between-country inequality that is rising. I 
use “societies” here to demonstrate that there is an increasing divide between the rich and poor, whether the 
unit of analysis is within- or between-countries. 
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and foreign-controlled spaces that lie within national and/or city boundaries–contributes 
to research around the construction of social boundaries and its relationship to the 
reproduction of inequality.  
Although Philippine scholars and activists tend to use the former U.S. bases and 
current Freeport Zones in the Philippines as symbols of U.S. imperialism and Philippine 
dependency (e.g., Kirk 1998; Go 2011), my aim here is to not generate a theory of U.S. 
and Philippine economic or military relations nor is it to say whether these spaces are 
“good” or “bad” for development. Rather, I seek to identify how specific foreign-
controlled sites within national boundaries perpetuate and maintain unequal spatial, 
economic, social and cultural international relationships. Political scientists and 
economists analyze the economic and political impact of military bases and Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) on host countries (e.g., Thompson 1975; Cooley 2008), and 
scholars writing from the perspective of feminist or ethnic studies emphasize their 
negative traits and consequences (e.g., Enloe 2000 [1990]). Historians and 
anthropologists analyze the expansion of frontier zones and cross-national ties within 
cities on national borders (e.g., Alvarez 1995). I combine these approaches with global 
city scholarship to analyze the new globalized and analytic spaces of “global 
borderlands.”  
In this article, I first define global borderlands and detail their shared features. 
Next, I situate global borderlands with the literatures on global cities, which are 
economic command and control centers, and traditional borderlands, which highlight 
micro interactions across two national boundaries, and note that global borderlands 
represent nationally bounded, foreign-controlled centers for cultural and social 
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interactions that also have important economic influence for their host nations.  In this 
way, they are localized command and control centers of varied forms of foreign 
exchange. Third, I outline my methodologies and describe the micro setting of the case 
study, the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) in the Philippines.  
Next I focus on the three features that global borderlands share and show (1) how 
the semi-autonomy of global borderlands produces different regulations depending on 
nationality through an analysis of the legal case trial on the rape of Nicole, (2) how their 
geographic and symbolic borders differentiates these spaces from their surrounding 
communities vis-à-vis the socio-spatial organization, moral discourses, and cultural 
practices associated with the SBFZ, and (3) how the semi-autonomy of these locales and 
their geographic and symbolic borders reproduce unequal relations. To do so, I compare 
structural inequality within the SBFZ with locals’ and foreigners’ cultural understandings 
of these unequal exchanges to show how inequality is institutionalized in everyday 
cultural practices and discourses. I also show on how locals’ perceptions of Americans 
and Koreans are filtered through the broader U.S.-Philippine and Korean-Philippine 
relations. Although separately, these three features are common, how they come together 
in global borderlands is unique because they lie within spaces that are foreign-controlled. 
I conclude by describing the significance of analyzing global borderlands as a new unit of 
analysis and a social phenomenon. By examining interactions within foreign-controlled 
spaces, I focus on how unequal relations between countries play out on the ground, and 
the negotiations that occur in spaces where a state’s sovereignty is fluid not just for 
businesses–as could be argued for global cities–but within geographically-defined 
territories. 
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Global borderlands: A definition 
Global borderlands are semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled geographic locations 
geared toward international exchange. By “international exchange” I mean the 
combination of social, cultural, and economic exchanges and interactions, since each 
cannot be divorced from the others. Economic exchanges are rooted in shared cultural 
understandings and social relationships (e.g., Zelizer 2013; DiMaggio and Louch 1998). 
At the same time, cultural and social interactions often involve exchange and have 
important economic consequences. I also use the term “foreign-controlled” to refer to 
either foreign ownership or heavy foreign influence, where this influence is one of the 
defining characteristics of a space–for example, special economic zones are not foreign-
owned but are created to cultivate foreign investment. Additionally, global borderlands 
are territorially defined locations where distinct international, state, and sub-national legal 
orders overlap, are negotiated, and directly influence one another. These sites include 
overseas military bases, SEZs2 (for example, the island province of Hainan in China), all-
inclusive tourist resorts, embassies, cruise ships, and international branch campuses.  
For example, NYU Abu Dhabi is a global borderland because it is a U.S.-
controlled and -owned university in the United Arab Emirates; however, NYU in New 
York City is not. The semi-autonomy of universities in general–which includes the 
maintenance of their own police forces–is not the same because the semi-autonomy of 
global borderlands is based on nationality. Additionally, all-inclusive American-owned 
                                                 
2
 Special economic zones (SEZ) is a generic term that encapsulates a “geographically delimited area 
administered by a single body, offering certain incentives (generally duty-free importing and streamlined 
customs procedures) to businesses which physically locate within the zone (FIAS report:10)” This includes 
free trade zones, export processing zones, enterprise zones, freeports, single factory EPZ, and specialized 
zones (e.g. science parks), each with functions varying from the processing of imports which are then 
exported out from the country, to duty free shopping . Because they take different forms, names and sizes 
in countries and these types differ by region, there is no overarching international governing body 
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resorts, such as the CasaMagna Marriott Cancun Resort in Cancun, Mexico, or 
timeshares, such as the RCI-owned Mayan Place Acapulco in Acapulco, Mexico are 
global borderlands, but a locally owned and operated hotel in Mexico is not. These places 
share a basic framework of semi-autonomy and foreign control, symbolic and geographic 
boundaries, and international exchange and unequal relations.  
In much the same way as Sassen (2001[1991]) uses the term “global” to 
emphasize how globalization is structured and localized in the current era (p. xix), I use 
the term “global” in global borderlands to highlight how globalized interactions are 
structured and localized in particular places, whose histories and connections with foreign 
authorities shape the interactions that occur within them. In these spaces, legal authority 
and applicability is ambiguous, and law and punishment differ depending on the identity 
of the criminal and the context of the crime. This nationality-based semi-autonomy 
occurs on a continuum. For example, overseas military bases are ruled by separate laws–
not those of the host nations–while within SEZs, national economic laws, such as tariff 
barriers, are relaxed.3 For all-inclusive, foreign-owned resorts, semi-autonomy is much 
more informal. 
In developing countries, these spaces represent a particular type of global 
borderland defined by the historical and contemporary power relations between countries 
and the asymmetric distribution of resources among foreign visitors, local visitors and 
local workers. They are not “flat” spaces of international exchange; instead they are 
defined by macro (state-to-state) relationships between countries as well as by the micro-
interactions that occur between foreigners and locals, which are further defined by 
                                                 
3
 Imports often stay confined within these areas; however, locals are also sometimes able to partake in these 
goods and services in small doses–as is in the case of the SBFZ. 
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individuals’ class, nationality, race/ethnicity and gender. By examining semi-autonomous 
non-city and non-national foreign-controlled spaces surrounded by geographic and 
symbolic borders, we can shed light on spatial and symbolic segregation within urban 
sociology (Paulsen 2004; Borer 2006) and how overlapping legal orders are managed on 
the ground and in the courts (Benton 2008; Merry 1988). Global borderlands, in 
particular, represent physical areas where governance and regulations increasingly 
depend on national identity.  
Such sites are not insignificant. For example, military bases are often bundled 
with forms of military and economic aid, leave behind permanent structures that can later 
be used locally, and are an important source of employment for locals in host countries. 
The number of U.S. overseas military bases alone grew from 173 in 32 countries in 1995 
to 750 in 45 countries in 2010 (e.g., Cooley 2008; Evinger 1995; United States 
Department of Defense 2010).4 Similarly, the construction of SEZs is one way countries 
try to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), which has consequences for national 
development–though the benefits and consequences are debated–and the meanings 
associated with SEZs differ depending on local context (FIAS report 2008; Evans and 
Timberlake 1980; Dixon and Boswell 1996; Rondinelli 1987; Fernandez-Kelly 1989; Lee 
1995). Export Processing Zones (EPZs), one of many types of SEZ, grew from 93 in 25 
countries in 1997 to 3,500 in 130 countries in 2006 (Boyenge 2007).  
Similarly, tourism has been called the “world’s biggest business” and affects 
GDP, employment rates, exports, imports and national images (e.g., Goldstone 2001:2, 
Rivera 2008; Wherry 2007). All-inclusive resorts and timeshares shape local markets and 
                                                 
4
 The U.S. military invested $182 billion between 1989 and 1991 (just a few years before the military 
withdrawal) in buildings, structures, infrastructure, and operational and recreational facilities within the 
Subic Bay Naval Base; United States General Accounting Office (1992) 
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structure the interaction among different groups of people. Their very success depends on 
successful short-term relationships being built across nationalities. As of September 
2014, the company RCI alone operated 271 resort/vacation exchanges in Africa and the 
Middle East, 593 in Asia, 234 in Australia and South Pacific, 114 in Canada, 281 in the 
Caribbean and Bermuda, 62 in Central America, 1037 in Europe, 476 in Mexico, and 375 
in South America.5 
The impact of global borderlands can be immense. Each has its own 
infrastructure, workers, and consumers, and they can represent a microcosm of the 
relationship between the host and guest nations. Although formal agreements related to 
embassies, military bases, and international branch campuses have the most visible and 
direct connection between micro-interactions and broader, international arrangements, 
timeshares and all-inclusive resorts also share such a connection. For example, in 2013, 
news that six tourists were raped in Acapulco, Mexico–a center of foreign tourism–made 
global news precisely because it occurred in these spaces;6 additionally, state travel 
warnings lead tourists to choose certain destinations over others. In contrast to global 
cities, which are concentrated financial hubs, a single borderland in a single country may 
not account for a significant share of overall economic, cultural or social global 
exchange. However, the sheer number of these institutions is significant and they occur in 
all regions of the world.  
Forms of international exchange 
                                                 
5
 RCI online resort directory, http://www.rci.com/resort-directory/landing, last accessed September 15, 
2014. Although this measure is problematic since it is an American-based organization, it allows for some 
tangible measure of this phenomenon. 
6See for example: http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/05/world/americas/mexico-tourists-raped/, last accessed 
September 15, 2014  
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Social science research has a long history of investigating forms of international 
exchange. For example, global cities are financial command and control centers; they are 
city nodes created by, and dependent on, an international economic network (Sassen 
2001[1991]; Friedmann 1986; Friedman and Wolff 1982). Such cities are strategic 
research sites for examining the economic processes of globalization and their 
implications for internal city dynamics and inequality, as well as for stratification on a 
global scale. Some scholars debate which cities can be considered “global cities,” while 
others have worked to identify cities’ positions in the world city network and how these 
cities are shaped by historically specific, localized processes (Hall 1996; Baum 1997; 
Smith and Timberlake 2001; Rimmer 1998; Wang 2004). 
Similarly, research on geopolitical borders similarly looks at sites of international 
exchange. Although sometimes the words “frontiers” and “borderlands” are used 
interchangeably because they both represent the meeting between different types of 
groups and acknowledge the existence of “internal” (within a specified territory) and 
“external” (across two territories) spaces (Donnan and Wilson 2010; D’Argemir and 
Pujadas 1999), frontier scholarship tends to have a one-sided, imperial focus on powers 
expanding into “borderless” lands (such as colonial expansion into the American 
Southwest) and is “outward-oriented.” In contrast, borderland researchers tend to analyze 
how national ideologies and understandings of “belonging” are shaped by changing 
political and transportation boundaries; how individuals and states are culturally, socially, 
and financially linked; how borderlands are sites of informal and formal consumption, 
and cross-national organizational cooperation; how borderland or transnational identities 
and cosmopolitanism are created; and how borderlands are sites of contestation, 
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negotiation, and meaning-making (Rutherford 2011; Tirres 2008-2010; Rippl, Bucker, 
Petrat and Boehnke 2010; Widdis 2010; Pisani 2013; Adelman and Aron 1999).  
Other scholars take a less optimistic view, suggesting that both border patrols and 
residents on either side of the border can place people into wanted and unwanted 
categories based on nationality, race/ethnicity, and class (Helleiner 2012; Sundberg 2008; 
Heyman 2009; Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles 2012). To these scholars, geo-
political borderlands are sites of institutionalized inequality, are rooted in national 
boundaries, or form the symbolic identities of people living in two cultures (Anzaldua 
1999; Alvarez 1995). However, precisely because these researchers focus on geopolitical 
borders or cities along these borders, they tend to ignore bounded sites within the state 
that share similar characteristics. 
 In analyzing global borderlands, I draw on literatures that emphasize how these 
borderlands act as sites where people of groups interact and how they maintain and 
reproduce inequalities through social and economic relations as well as cultural 
meanings. The global cities literature is also important because of the similarities global 
cities and global borderlands share in their social organization, where the dynamics of the 
rich necessarily depend on the work of the poor and because the empirical approach to 
analyzing and identifying global cities can be adapted to the analysis of global 
borderlands.  
In defining “global borderlands” as semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled 
geographic locations geared towards international exchange, I draw on Sassen’s (2000, 
2003 [2000], 2006) work on “analytic borderlands,” which are a “formation of particular 
types of territoriality assembled out of ‘national’ and ‘global’ elements, each individual 
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or aggregate instance evincing distinct spatio-temporal features” (Sassen 2006, p. 386). 
They are “assemblages” of both the national and local. I similarly emphasize the need to 
identify places, understand how they are rooted in historical localized processes, examine 
their “social thickness” and understand the interconnected (that is, not mutually 
exclusive) and partial nature of the global and the national, as well as the transformation 
of states’ and people’s territory, authority, and rights. However, my work deviates from 
Sassen’s in important ways.  
First, I focus on foreign-controlled spaces within a sovereign nation-state. Global 
borderlands are specific places of semi-autonomy based on nationality. Second, my 
emphasis on place is rooted in specific geographic locations and their ties to local 
context. Although the analytic borderlands of digitized finance are “inserted in the 
physical space of national territory, they may have little to do with the surrounding 
context” (Sassen 2006, p. 394). Within global borderlands, the country, city, and 
immediate community in which they are located, the local history, and the historic and 
contemporary relationship between the host nation-state and foreign visitors’ countries of 
origin are all important. This grounding in history is necessary to understand the complex 
interactions that occur within these spaces, and the implications these interactions have 
for broader state-to-state relationships.  
For example, it is important that the SBFZ’s buildings are former U.S. naval 
structures, and that it is located in Olongapo City, and not in another Philippine city. The 
relationship between the U.S. Navy and Olongapo is distinct from the relationship 
between Subic Bay Naval Base’s sister base, Clark Air Force Base, and its surrounding 
community, Angeles City. I argue that this is, in part, because of the greater integration of 
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the U.S. Navy with Olongapo. The Subic Bay Naval Base employed almost four times as 
did Clark, and the navy was integrated into the Olongapo political dynasty of the 
Gordons–the first mayor of Olongapo City was the son of an American Marine (Bowen 
1986). Finally, whereas Sassen (2006) emphasizes analytic borderlands’ cross-national 
connections, the networked nature of global borderlands is an empirical question. 
 In analyzing the spaces of “global borderlands,” I follow previous work on how 
place, culture, and economy interact with global and national processes. However, I 
extend this literature by examining how these interactions and processes occur within 
foreign-controlled spaces that are geared toward international exchange.  
Methodology and data 
I use qualitative historical, interview, ethnographic, and case study methods to 
examine the forms of interactions that occur within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone in the 
Philippines. I focus on the SBFZ because, as the home of a former U.S. military base and 
the current site of a Freeport Zone (FZ), it serves as a particularly “strategic research site” 
(Merton 1987) to examine the different ways that groups interact with varied forms of 
foreign control within a space of unequal power.  
Historical sociology “is the attempt to understand the relationship of personal 
activity and experience on the one hand and social organization on the other as something 
that is continuously constructed in time” (Abrams 1982, p. 16). Indeed, social, political, 
legal, and economic acts have “historical residue” (Sewell 2005, p. 7) that impact 
contemporary conditions, and I use an intensive strategy of studying a single place to 
develop meaningful historical interpretation (Gocek 1995, p. 107). Following Braudel 
(1975), I emphasize (a) path-dependent social conditions and processes that generate 
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historical spaces, and (b) the experiences of local actors (Gocek 1995). I also follow 
Bradshaw and Wallace’s (1991) assertion that single case studies are particularly useful 
for generating theory when they focus on a “special…set of circumstances or phenomena 
that warrant intensive study” (p. 155). The SBFZ’s long history as first, as a Spanish 
arsenal, then as a U.S. naval base, coupled with its current iteration as a Freeport Zone, 
allows me to conduct in-depth study of a single place that has experienced varied forms 
of colonial and military foreign power.  
I use in-depth interviews, nine months of ethnographic observation, documents 
and statistical information. I conducted 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews of foreign 
visitors, local visitors and local workers, a survey of hotel managers inside the FZ, and 
informal interviews of local government workers and others whom I befriended in my 
daily routine. Interviews revolved around their perceptions of the FZ, reasons that they 
visited or worked inside the FZ, comparisons between inside and outside the FZ, and 
where they eat, shop, and work. Interviews with foreign visitors were conducted in 
English. I am also an intermediate speaker of Filipino (Tagalog), one of the national 
languages of the Philippines, and interviews with local workers and local visitors were 
conducted in Tagalog, unless they requested to be interviewed in English. Interviewees 
were recruited through a flyer, then through snowball sampling where interviewees 
recommended others. In-depth interviews are an important source of information that 
allows researchers to get at meanings and collective understandings. 
I also used a targeted ethnographic approach, spending a total of nine months in 
the local area over three three-month periods to focus on specific borderlands and how 
they interrelate. In the spirit of classical ethnographic community studies (e.g., Gans 
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1962; Stack 1974), I moved into an apartment that was approximately 15 minutes by foot 
from the SBFZ, made daily trips into the SBFZ, and conducted participant observation 
inside both places (e.g., shopping at local food markets, using local jeepney 
transportation, and visiting local businesses). My ethnographic observations produced 
three types of data: (1) counts of the number of hotels, businesses, and foreign visitors 
inside and outside the borderlands, (2) observations of popular spaces of interactions and 
non-interactions among different groups, with a particular focus on differences in skin 
color, signals of class, and nationality, and (3) differences in the facilities and resources 
available in spaces geared toward foreigners versus those that were not. Documents were 
similarly analyzed using an inductive approach that emphasizes identifying emergent 
theoretical and substantive patterns. 
I conducted keyword searches of “Subic Bay Naval Base,” “Subic Bay Freeport 
Zone,” “Subic Bay,” and “Olongapo City” using Westlaw and LexisNexis for U.S. court 
cases as well as ChanRobles Virtual Law Library and Lawphil.net for Philippine legal 
cases. Philippine-U.S. treaties, as well as Philippine government documents, such as 
executive orders and republic acts, were also gathered from ChanRobles and Lawphil.net. 
Additionally, I have paper copies of Philippine local cases from visits to the Olongapo 
City regional trial courts (RTCs); however, these are limited because the 1992 eruption of 
Mt. Pinatubo, which destroyed Clark Air Force Base and damaged the Subic Bay Naval 
Base, also destroyed many files. The cases I highlight give insight into the types of 
international disputes that occur within global borderlands. I obtained SBFZ statistics 
from SBFZ workers in various departments. 
Analytic approach 
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In analyzing my data, I take a relational approach (Zelizer 2010; Zelizer 2005; 
Bandelj 2002; Bandelj 2009) that emphasizes the relationship between two or three 
parties. For example, in contrast to global or world-systems analyses that take into 
account how the unit of analysis (cities, countries) fits into a global or national 
understanding, I draw and expand on Bandelj (2002, 2009) to suggest a more specific 
approach aimed at understanding how relationships among actors shape localized 
interactions. I have argued elsewhere (2013), that to understand global inequality, we 
need to analyze how relationships between countries differ based on their specific 
historical, institutional, and cultural connections. Thus, my analytic approach emphasizes 
historical connections, cultural understandings, and social structures, and how they relate 
to macro and micro power relations. For example, to examine the SBFZ in the 
Philippines, it is not enough to consider the Philippines’ former or contemporary global 
position, or its U.S. colonial past. Rather, understanding specific relationships–for 
example, between the U.S. and the Philippines, Australia and the Philippines, and Japan 
and the Philippines–can illuminate how Filipino workers and locals understand and 
interact with different types of foreigners, depending on their nationality.  
Furthermore, in contrast to Sassen (2006) who emphasizes that economic actors 
(defined as firms, organizations, and business people) encounter jurisdictional overlaps in 
analytic borderlands and that these spaces privilege the “multiple ‘rights’ to foreign 
actors” (Sassen 2006, p. 208), I follow legal pluralist scholars who emphasize the plural 
nature of legal orders (e.g., they are not limited to state laws, but also include normative 
orders). Thus, my focus is on how these multiple legal orders are differently and similarly 
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understood and followed by foreigner and local actors. Furthermore, I compare not just 
foreigners and local workers, but also local visitors. 
The setting: Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines 
The SBFZ is a strategic location to study global borderlands allowing me to 
examine how varied forms of foreign authority and investment influence local dynamics. 
It served as a port for Spanish colonial powers and was home to the largest overseas U.S. 
naval base (Subic Bay Naval Base, or SBNB) until 1992; it now functions as a key 
tourism location and an FZ, which continues to host U.S. military ships, and also contains 
a port district, shipping and manufacturing businesses, universities, an international 
school, a local zoo, a water park, duty-free shopping centers, an upscale mall, three gated 
communities and land shared with the Aetas–an indigenous group. The very visibility of 
the different types of interactions and conflicts that take place in the SBFZ, rather than 
any differences in the nature of these interactions, makes it an ideal case study to examine 
inequality, legal ambiguity, and the porous or non-porous construction of boundaries 
within foreign-controlled spaces.  
Semi-autonomy 
I draw on the legal geography and legal pluralism literatures to examine the 
ambiguity and contextual nature of the semi-autonomous legal spaces of the SBNB and 
SBFZ. Legal geographers emphasize the interwoven connections between space and law, 
and how this relationship produces and reproduces meanings, identities, and 
differentiations among people (Blandy and Sibley 2010; Butler 2009; Delaney, Ford, and 
Blomley 2001). Territories and bounded spaces are not found; rather, their borders are 
created, negotiated, and contested. They mediate the relationship between individuals and 
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their governing authority, and they are spatial representations of power and inequality 
(Blomley 2010).  
The negotiations and rules over and within borders and places often occur with 
spaces where different cultures and people interact. For example, drawing on the legal 
geography literature, Gould (2003) demonstrates how British settlers engaged in different 
behaviors, obeying or flouting British laws, depending on whom they came in contact 
with. In this way, settlers justified acts of war with non-Europeans because “into the early 
years of the eighteenth century, the British…held that key European treaties did not apply 
(or did not apply with equal force) outside the so-called lines of amity, the imaginary 
quadrant that distinguished Europe from Asia, Africa, and the Americas” (479). 
Similarly, certain acts, such as scalping were prohibited except when the enemy were 
“Indians, or Canad[ians] dressed like Indians” (Gould 2003, p. 483). Whom the 
Europeans interacted with and where these interactions took place determined what laws 
they would follow.  
Scholars interested in similar cross-cultural interactions often also draw on 
research on legal pluralism, defined as social fields where two or more legal systems 
coexist (Berman 2009; Griffiths 1986; Tamanaha 2007; Michaels 2009; Merry 1988). 
The research on legal pluralism acknowledges how jurisdiction over people, rules, norms, 
and expectations is increasingly ambiguous and depends on the identity of individuals 
and the government. For examples, scholars have shown how colonial regimes shape 
indigenous laws, how courts blend indigenous and national laws, how unofficial religious 
laws are practiced to reassert identity, how international legal decisions influence 
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domestic laws, and how national and transnational court decisions are intertwined 
(Synder 1981; Yilmaz 2008; De Sousa Santos 2006; Scheppele 2010). 
Legal geographers have emphasized the role that place and space play in 
negotiations and contestations over legal authority, while insights from legal pluralism 
highlight how people on the ground negotiate and behave in spaces where legal rules, 
authority, practices and norms overlap. Global borderlands are geographically defined 
places that are semi-sovereign, foreign-controlled and predicated on intersections 
between different groups of people and nations, where the legal order is increasingly 
differentiated depending on nationality.  
In the case of the SBFZ, important legal and cultural issues such as sovereignty, 
legal authority, and power differentials come to light through a number of cases and 
agreements. The 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that currently governs U.S. 
armed forces in the Philippines has roots in the original 1947 Military Bases Agreement 
(MBA), and the U.S. and R.P. (Republic of the Philippines) negotiated very specific 
terms around who has authority over what, where, and when regarding both civil and 
criminal matters. The results of these negotiations reflect the uneven power dynamics that 
govern macro U.S. and R.P. relations.  
For example, an important VFA article delineates who has jurisdiction over what 
crimes and under which circumstances. The U.S. has jurisdiction with regard to: (1) “all 
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United 
States over United States personnel in the Philippines,” including offenses solely against 
U.S. property, security or persons, or those done in performance of official duty. The R.P. 
has jurisdiction over U.S. personnel over all other offenses, except those spelled out for 
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U.S. jurisdiction. Although these guidelines are similar to those of the earlier MBA, there 
are added sections to the VFA article on criminal jurisdiction that are presumably 
included to give full credence to Philippine sovereignty. For instance, if the U.S. 
authorities determine that an act is done in the performance of official duty, they have to 
issue a certificate to Philippine authorities and if those authorities question the 
certificate’s validity, a review that includes U.S. and R.P. authorities “at the highest 
levels.” However, like the MBA, the VFA has other ambiguous and not-so-ambiguous 
clauses that structure the U.S.-R.P. relationship so as to limit full use of Philippine 
sovereignty. For instance, either government may request the other to waive its primary 
right, but  
recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good 
order and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the 
United States, waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of 
particular importance to the Philippines 
 
The treaty allows a channel of contestation, but the U.S. has only to take these 
requests into account and does not have to abide by them. Furthermore, once an 
American is convicted, his or her confinement or detention by the R.P. “shall be carried 
out in facilities agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities.” The 
language that specifies court and custody jurisdiction is left ambiguous, with clear 
avenues for individual R.P. and U.S. officials to come to an agreement that leaves the 
negotiations open to influences of power and pressure.  
The case of Nicole 
Issues regarding the one-year time limit for trials–after which the U.S. does not 
have any obligations to produce an accused person–and of custody before, during, and 
after trial, which are included in the VFA, are contested, and this can be seen through the 
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legal case trial of the rape of Nicole, a pseudonym used by Philippine courts and media to 
protect her identity. On October 30, 2005 Nicole, a 22 year-old Filipina, and her sister 
traveled to the Subic Bay Freeport Zone under the invitation of two servicemen who were 
their friends. After a night of drinking and dancing on the 31st, and in a white van with 
three other servicemen in the back, Nicole and Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith had 
sexual intercourse – rape as alleged by Nicole, consensual sex as countered by Smith. 
This case ended in April 2009 when Smith’s guilty verdict was overturned by the 
Philippine Court of Appeals.  
Nicole’s trial was popularly known as the Subic Rape Case. The custody of Smith 
before, during and after his trial–but not court jurisdiction–was at the forefront of 
controversy between the two nations. In his ruling on Smith’s petition to be transferred to 
U.S. custody after his conviction–which was dismissed before he ruled, because Smith 
had already been transferred to U.S. authorities–Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. 
eloquently outlines why and how custody relates to sovereignty and dependence. He said 
that “at the core of the controversy is the basic question of who gets to keep a person who 
has been charged, tried and convicted of committing a crime, or stated differently, who 
should punish persons who commit crimes in a given territory.” He framed the issue of 
custody in terms of sovereignty and territorial supremacy, when he said that being able to 
punish people for the crimes committed within their boundaries is the sign of a sovereign 
state.7 Additionally, he pointed out how jurisdiction and custody go hand in hand, the one 
                                                 
7
 This echoes Weber’s definition of power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will 
be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber 1978:53) and the state as an actor who 
“successful upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of 
order” (Guenther and Wittich 1978:54). 
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being an essential part of the other, and that the VFA is about protecting the people of the 
host nation, not the foreign, visiting soldiers.  
In his ruling, Judge Bruselas also noted that the U.S. did not immediately turn 
Smith over after his arrest, and that officials did not respond to multiple requests (through 
embassy notes) from the Philippine government for custody of Smith, nor did they file an 
official request for his custody. This assertion is borne out through an analysis of the 
embassy notes in question (see CA-G.R. SP. NO. 97212 for copies of these notes). On 
November 16, 2005, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs sent an embassy note 
to the U.S. requesting that it turn over the servicemen involved in the alleged crime, 
noting that custody was to be decided among U.S. and Philippine authorities and citing 
the VFA clauses related to the non-receipt of a formal request for U.S. custody and the 
extraordinary, heinous nature of the case. The U.S. embassy ignored the note until a 
follow-up exchange almost two months later. On January 16, 2006, the U.S. responded 
that “having taken full account of the position of the Government of the Philippines 
regarding custody, the U.S. Government shall continue to exercise custody until 
completion of all judicial proceedings, as provided for by Article V, paragraph 6 of the 
Visiting Forces Agreement.”  
An immediate reply from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs clarifies 
why the Subic Rape Case qualifies as an extraordinary case. The note reads  
The Philippine Government is seriously concerned over the patent disparity in the 
treatment of U.S. military personnel in other countries on the issue of custody in criminal 
cases. In the light of the decision of the United States Government to maintain its position 
on the issue of custody during trial, the Department of Foreign Affairs wishes to continue 
discussions on this matter ... 
 
The U.S. retained custody of Smith until the end of the legal proceedings. 
However, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs’ reply outlines how the issues of 
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sovereignty and dependence rely, in part, on disputes between territory and nationality in 
criminal cases. They do so by noting the seeming pattern of unequal treatment of U.S. 
personnel–by virtue of their nationality and not dependent on the territorial authority in 
which the crimes were committed–in criminal cases across countries. 
This issue of disparate treatment based on nationality goes hand-in-hand with 
discussions of sovereignty and can also be seen through the discourse of the protesters 
during and after the trial. For example, in a November 1, 2006 protest, activists shouted, 
"U.S. band of rapists, guilty, ikulong, parusahan [jail them, punish them]," while Nicole, 
who helped lead the protest, asked, “Why can't our government do anything to stop the 
Americans from coming here? [We need] to avoid another rape [of Filipinas].” She also 
expressed dismay at the sight of US ships in Subic again “as if nothing happened, as if it 
is business as usual.”8 Likewise, in a November 21, 2006 rally, protester Joms Salvador, 
referring to the VFA and the U.S. custody of Smith, told a newspaper, "[the Philippine] 
government has long been subservient to the US."9 
Similar discourses arose after Smith’s guilty verdict–both in protests and in court 
documents. Although Smith’s conviction was seen as a victory of Philippine 
independence, the controversy over post-conviction custody and detention refueled the 
discourse of U.S. imperialism and Philippine dependency. For example, Evalyn Ursua, 
Nicole’s lawyer, said that she would “file criminal cases against Foreign Affairs 
Secretary Alberto Romula, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez and all those responsible for 
Smith’s transfer [because] they are all rapists. They raped our Constitution. They should 
                                                 
8
 http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/subicrapecase/view.php?db=1&article=20061102-30202, last 
accessed June 7, 2014 
9
 http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/subicrapecase/view.php?db=1&article=20061121-33922, last 
accessed June 7, 2014 
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all be held criminally liable.” Furthermore, she called U.S. efforts over the transfer “arm-
twisting” of the Philippine government and said that Philippine President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo could be impeached for allowing this “violation of our sovereignty” 
and “clear foreign intervention.”10  
Government officials also used the trial to condemn the U.S. For example, Bayan 
Muna partylist Representative Satur Ocampo said: 
The appellate court’s reversal of the lower court’s conviction of Lance Corporal Daniel 
Smith for raping [Nicole] is at bottom a major blow to our national sovereignty and 
dignity, and to Philippine jurisprudence…[the Court] adopted the defense side, as it gave 
more credence to the supposed recantation of the victim prepared by the lawyers of the 
accused…In practical effect, the Court of Appeals decision abets the abuses of ‘visiting’ 
US military forces that have a historical record since the long years of the US military 
bases presence in the country.  
 
The Court’s acquittal of Smith also raises questions about possible political 
pressure on the justices from the US government and the executive branch. Akbayan 
party list Representative Risa Hontiveros said that Malacañang’s [the President’s 
residence] role in facilitating Smith’s transfer to U.S. custody “lacked gender sensitivity 
and nationalism and [was] an insult to our nation.”11  
Nicole recanted her testimony before the Court of Appeals decision was filed, 
though the judge specifically stated that the court did not take the recantation into 
account. However, although the indirect effects of her recantation are unknown, it would 
not be far-fetched to think that her recantation, (in which she said that she “was so drunk 
when the incident happened” and “she raised doubts that Smith raped her, admitting that 
she was attracted to the US Marine officer”12) was subject to U.S. influence, since shortly 
                                                 
10
 http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/subicrapecase/view.php?db=1&article=20061230-40832, last 
accessed June 7, 2014 
11
 http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/subicrapecase/view.php?db=1&article=20090424-201241, last 
accessed June 7, 2014 
12
 http://www.preda.org/en/newsitems/subic-rape-victim-nicole-recanted-her-earlier-statements-that-lance-
corporal-daniel-smith-who-was-convicted-in-2007-raped-her/, last accessed June 7, 2014 
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after she withdrew her testimony, she permanently left the Philippines to reside in the 
United States. Her retraction could then be used by the U.S. and others to counter and/or 
silence the issues raised in the case.  
From the beginning of the trial until after Smith’s acquittal in 2009 by the 
Philippine Court of Appeals–which declared that there was insufficient evidence of rape–
judges, along with newspaper accounts, protests, and activist writings, imbued the 
various court decisions with symbolism, meanings, and understandings of sovereignty, 
respect, and (in)dependence among nations. Perhaps one of the most widely covered 
trials related to U.S. and Philippine relations in the Philippines, this case, despite formal 
agreements on criminal jurisdiction, shows the fluidity of semi-sovereignty, the varied 
meanings it holds, and the importance and negotiations over space, place, and nationality, 
despite formal agreements on criminal jurisdiction. 
Geographic and symbolic borders 
The semi-autonomy and legal geography of the SBFZ are demarcated by 
geographical and symbolic borders. The theory of global cities also includes an 
increasing spatial separation between the rich and the poor (e.g., Sassen 2001[1991]; 
Friedmann 1986). For example, Loukaitou-Sideris and Gilbert (2000) argue that workers 
not only occupy separate spaces, but also differently perceive and attach meanings of 
“belonging,” safety, and group territory to specific sections of downtown L.A. This idea 
that cities are bounded, that certain areas cater to certain types of people, and that 
strangers or “others” are not wanted is not a new concept. Since their origin, cities have 
been both political and spatial phenomena (e.g., Pirenne 1969) and they reflect the 
stratification of the societies to which they belong (Massey 2005). For example, much of 
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the research on cities has shown the geographic and symbolic segregation of minorities 
and the poor (e.g., Sassen 1990). This includes American residential segregation patterns, 
ethnic enclaves, colonial residence patterns, fortress cities, and slums (Massey and 
Denton 1993; Drakakis-Smith 2000). Such borders also serve to concentrate and spatially 
isolate the wealthy, for example, in gated communities, fortified enclaves, and suburban 
shopping malls (Grant and Mittelsteadt 2004; Blakely and Synder 1999; Caldeira 1996; 
Cohen 1996). These spatial arrangements are also often intertwined with symbolic 
meanings that enforce social boundaries (Lamont and Molnar 2002). Ethnographies, in 
particular, have a long tradition of examining how the meanings that people attach to 
places where they work, live, and visit are shaped by spatial organization (e.g., Cressey 
1932; DuBois 1996 [1899]; Drake and Cayton 1993[1945]; Zorbough 1929; Liebow 
1967; Anderson 1992; Duneier 2000).  
The city of Manila, Philippines, has been used to examine how these geographic 
borders interact with symbolic meanings and social stratification, and perpetuate class 
inequality (e.g., Shatkin 2005/2006; Berner and Korff 1995). For example, Garrido 
(2013) links the symbolic and geographic boundaries that separate the rich from the poor 
in Manila to the segregating practices that both groups engage in to reinforce their “sense 
of place”–where “certain types of places (enclaves or slums) or the people associated 
with those places elicit certain introspective states (mental states, including affect and 
motivation), which, in turn, predispose certain segregating practices” (Garrido 2013, p. 
1344)–thus maintaining spatial and social inequality. Global borderlands similarly 
highlight the segregation between the rich and the poor; however, these locations have 
legally enforced gated or guarded boundaries around a semi-autonomous space owned 
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and/or operated and influenced by foreigners. These boundaries involve not just 
racial/ethnic and class differences but also those based on nationality.  
For the SBFZ, these geographic and symbolic boundaries revolve around the 
institutionalization of the legacies of the U.S. military–in its built environment, 
discourses surrounding the differences between inside and outside, and associated 
cultural practices. The U.S. military left behind an estimated $8 billion worth of 
infrastructure (Bowen, Leinbach, and Mabazza 2002), and Filipino officials instilled 
these buildings with a cultural myth weaving together the site’s past as a base and its 
future as an economic stronghold. This is true in documents, where lease contracts 
continue to reference the military base; in the military bunkers-turned-gated housing 
communities for foreigners and Filipinos, whose residents are not permitted to change 
their military-based façade; and in other former U.S. buildings that were transformed for 
SBFZ use, for example, American ammunition bunkers that were turned into Zoobic 
Safari attractions, (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority 2009; Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority 2011, p. 14).13  
The visual legacies of the U.S. military are most telling at the SBFZ’s “Main” or 
Magsaysay gated and guarded walking entrance. A bridge runs over a tributary branch of 
the Kalaklan River and connects Olongapo City to the SBFZ. This bridge and the sentry 
stations–the first visual cues of the SBFZ–maintain the U.S. military’s original built 
forms. The sentry station has four queues, which vendors, residents, employers, 
employees, and students–who all require Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) 
IDs–as well as visitors and shoppers–who are not required to have IDs–must walk 
                                                 
13
 See Zoobic Safari’s “About” page for information related to the use of former ammunition bunkers, 
http://www.zoobic.com.ph/about 
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through to enter or leave the area. Armed Filipino guards sit and stand among the queues 
and in the station office to watch people as they come and go. They have the authority to 
search any person or item, and this is one way they regulate who enters the SBFZ, since 
no formal laws specify who is and is not allowed inside (Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority 1992). Thus, the guards can enforce the informal norm of excluding the poor 
and informal, unregistered vendors based on their “presentation of self” (Goffman 1959). 
Clothes, shoes, and general appearance all identify the rich, who “belong,” and the poor, 
who do not. According to my interviewees and the people I befriended during my 
fieldwork, there’s a noticeable and obvious difference in the clothing and appearance of 
people who frequent the SBFZ–their clothes are nice, without holes, they are well 
groomed, and they always wear shoes–and those who do not. 
Discourse comparing the SBFZ with the surrounding city of Olongapo also 
reinforces its geographic and symbolic boundaries. Interviewees and others I encountered 
still referred to SBFZ as “the base,” reflecting the common knowledge that it is distinct, 
different from Olongapo City, and for foreigners and rich Filipinos. Harbor Point mall 
workers describe the SBFZ as “clean,” “spacious,” “civilized,” “good,” “like Manila,” 
“safer,” “[having] lots of job opportunities,” and “disciplined” because of the prevalence 
of security officers and the perception that there is relatively less crime and less pollution. 
Although security officers serve as literal and figurative gatekeepers, their very presence 
signals a benefit to workers. Ramon,14 a Filipino contractor with the SBMA, said that the 
difference is apparent “the moment you step up in the gate. … It’s good in FZ. I think 
there in FZ much more order, as a practice [SBMA officials try] to continue [the] orderly 
[nature/practices of the] military base [when it transformed in]to the economic zone.” 
                                                 
14
 All names are pseudonyms 
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Maria, a Filipina high school teacher, said that the SBFZ is “better because [there is] lots 
of new stuff, [there’s] no trouble or noisy.” Jing, a Filipino local, said that you can “find 
all you want” in the SBFZ. Teresa, also a local Filipina, noted the contrast–the SBFZ is 
“not the same as outside... [there are] lots of obstacles there [in Olongapo City].” 
However, local workers’ and visitors’ view of security guards as symbols of safety and 
order was in direct contrast to the views of the U.S. military personnel I interviewed. In 
particular, Rob, an African American seaman, pointed out that guards often had empty 
holsters, and he wasn’t sure what kind of training they received, while George, a white 
American seaman, said he could probably “kill [them] with bare hands.”  
 Foreigner visitors see the SBFZ’s geographic and symbolic boundaries much like 
the locals do, though their references of place–their home country–are different. For 
example, Jeremy, a white Australian whose business is in the SBFZ, says that there’s a 
“big difference [compared to Olongapo]. The Freeport, [is] just normal,” (emphasis 
mine). Pat, a white British businessman, concurred; he said that “the Freeport is 
organized and it's safer, I think, than outside.” Mary, a white Canadian who had been 
active in business in the SBFZ since its inception reminisced:  
There are two different answers to that, if you ask [what the differences 
were between the SBFZ and Olongapo City] 10 years ago, I’ll give you 
a completely different answer.  Well, as you know, the Freeport started 
in 1992, virtually and it was a very exciting time because the Freeport 
was being transformed from military base to what it is today.  It was a 
lot more exciting and fewer problems, fewer people, bus traffic, it was 
exciting.  A lot of the people coming here as investors at the time were 
form different countries all over the place and it was much smaller than 
it is now, so you could kind of need people as they moved in and they 
were very sure the same kind of problems and where can I get this, that 
sort thing. Now, it’s all spread out.  There isn’t that same sort of 
community, can I call it camaraderie, than they used to be 
 
Now, Mary laments, with the building of the Harbor Point mall,  
where you get a bigger influx of people of course there’s more crime, if 
you will, mostly petty crime but copper theft is a huge problem here.  
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Anything that’s got copper in it, street lights, sometimes two kilometers 
of street lights will not be working, we find out because they're stealing 
the wires constantly, which is a shame.  
 
Gloria, a white American who spends part of her time in the SBFZ, and the other 
in Hong Kong, when asked about the differences between the SBFZ and Olongapo said:  
You know, it’s just a different environment. So there’s [the] issue [of going 
places at certain times to avoid crowds], but the other thing that’s hard to see, is 
it’s hard to see my husband fished a bunch of dead -- or bunch of kittens live out 
of the garbage can.  I’ve to see yet a day where there’s not someone urinating in 
public or an animal being abused outside of the Freeport.  It doesn’t happen very 
much and that really affects you on the psychological level … [though] it's 
definitely safer also.  That’s a very big point.  The other point is the chances of 
me being harassed at Royal are a lot less than at the palengke. The chances of 
my vehicle being broken into or just is not the same in the Freeport. So, a lot of 
people will live here and face it will pay more and cost more just to be able to 
have that, I won’t say higher standard for living but you’re actually essentially 
paying for a safer environment even though it’s not related to the security 
officers 
 
These discourses are associated with distinct cultural practices that differ from 
those outside the SBFZ. One practice that contributes to these discourses is trash pickup. 
The absence of litter within the FZ is particularly noticeable as soon as you walk through 
the main gate. The FZ’s cleanliness is one of the first things Filipino workers, Filipino 
visitors, and foreign visitors alike commented on when asked about the differences inside 
and outside the zone. Litter is perceived as “bad” in the U.S. (Sampson and Raudenbush 
2004; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Although environmental laws prohibit littering in the 
Philippines (Philippines 1975; Philippines 1997; Philippines 2001), throwing trash on the 
ground is the norm. I have seen people hold onto trash inside the SBFZ, and throw it on 
the ground as soon as they exit the gate. 
Just as Murphy (2012) observes for American suburbs, the structural constraints 
of the availability of trashcans and trash collection contribute to the buildup of litter 
around Olongapo City.  However, these factors do not account for all of it. Convenience 
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stores, branch fast food restaurants, and the SM mall15 in Olongapo City all have 
trashcans outside their storefronts, and employees maintain their cleanliness. 
Additionally, the SBFZ trashcans are often filled not with garbage, but rather with leaves, 
tree branches and other miscellaneous items. Trashcans do not automatically mean that 
people will place litter inside them. And the practice of not littering is more strictly 
enforced in certain areas of the SBFZ than in others. For example, near the gated 
entrances as well as within and around businesses, litter is absent; however, a walk or 
drive around the various parts where there is not a lot of foot traffic and few visitors 
shows that certain pockets of the FZ do continue to accumulate litter. The institutional 
legacy does not influence cultural practices evenly.  
The differences in these practices result from official enforcement of rules and 
regulations and from local government officials cultivating the institutional legacy of the 
military base. When the base was operational, rules prohibited litter. When the military 
withdrew, Filipinos continued the American patterns of behavior because they had 
become normalized and routinized. The first SBMA chairman also preserved and policed 
these behaviors to maintain the symbolic link to the U.S. and to court international 
businesses by signaling the SBFZ’s status as a standard Western environment. As 
Douglas (2008 [1966]) argues, social relations and stratification are reinforced by 
practices and discourses of pollution and cleanliness. In the SBFZ practices that reduce 
visible litter and trash are one way that Filipinos and foreigners alike reinforce the 
symbolic and geographic boundaries that separate it from Olongapo.  In other types of 
global borderlands, these boundaries may take different forms.  
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 SM trashcans are only available during store hours–every morning workers haul them outside, every 
night they are brought in 
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However, some of these geographic and symbolic boundaries, and the practices 
associated with them, are more permeable than others. Corruption is a prime example of 
how Philippine practices penetrate the SBFZ. Bureaucracy and red tape in the SBFZ, and 
in the Philippines in general, present an opportunity for corruption and it contributes to 
inequality in that jobs are often created to be given to certain people over others. It 
becomes a cycle, where jobs are created due to over-population and utang na loob (debt 
of gratitude, reciprocating social or economic debts and taking care of family), which 
then creates obstacles to employment; for example, requiring paperwork that necessitates 
multiple signatures from multiple offices. Local workers at the Harbor Point mall note 
that there is no clear guideline for how to fulfill work requirements, such as medical 
clearance, SBMA ID, SBFZ ID, specific store ID, security clearance, or a letter from 
their barangay [neighborhood] captain [the elected official who represents the barangay] 
who testifies to the candidates’ “moral being.” Kelly (2001) argues that this requirement 
helps prevent union strikes since barangay captains hold deep influence over families. 
Some workers lamented that it was very difficult to obtain the paperwork they needed to 
begin their job because they had no knowledge of how to navigate the bureaucracy. 
Although some workers obtain employment through SBMA job fairs, many people are 
hired because of connections, often when a friend alerts them to an opening in their store 
and walks them through the paperwork process. However, this and other forms of 
corruption are deeply endemic to Philippine society, so workers tend to expect it.  
 Foreigners who live and work near or inside the SBFZ also articulate how 
corruption occurs within the SBFZ. For example, Jeremy talked about needing to factor 
bribes into his business expenses, since truck drivers going to Manila to pick up material 
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are consistently stopped by police and required to pay bribes, and Pat shared how his 
business contracts were held up or turned down at the last minute due to certain 
politicians’ influences. He also noticed, because he has ongoing cases against employees 
who owe him a debt, how people are able to hold up the court process if “they pay the 
right person.” Both of these men described the corruption of customs agents, who 
required exorbitant bribes to release shipping containers, regardless of whether they 
contained legal or illegal goods.  
The borders signifying the SBFZ are ambiguously seen. For foreigners, the SBFZ 
is at times too Filipino and corrupt, while at other times, it reflects a community “like 
home.” To Filipinos the social stratification reinforced by these boundaries designates 
this space as American and Western–for foreigners and rich Filipinos. The maintenance 
(e.g., litter) or disregard (e.g., corruption) of some laws over others highlights the semi-
permeability of these borders, and how they differ depending on social position and 
nationality, as well as the intent of government officials.16 The geographic and symbolic 
borders that surround these semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled spaces signify unequal 
exchanges between different groups of people. 
Unequal relations 
A key feature of global borderlands is that the nature of their inequality is such 
that the everyday unequal interactions between different groups of people reflect 
differences not only between classes, but also broader power structures between 
countries, since they are foreign-controlled. However, unequal relationships are not 
exclusive to global borderlands. A key component of the global or world city hypothesis 
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 For an more in-depth examination of the legacies of the U.S. military on the SBFZ’s socio-spatial 
organization, see Reyes (unpublished) 
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is that the economic concentration within global cities necessarily relies on economic and 
social polarization, and that the creation and maintenance of global cities relies on the 
growing chasm between the very rich and the very poor, which includes particular 
relationships involving race, gender, and immigrant status–though others maintain that 
global cities can be linked to a rise in professionalization (Sassen 2001[1991]; 
Mollenkopf and Castells 1992; Hamnett 1994; Baum 1999).  
Particularly when they are in developing countries, global borderlands–like many 
other places–are also built on structural foundations of inequality. The establishment and 
closing of U.S. military bases are associated with changing patterns of employment, 
travel, and crime (e.g., Thanner and Segal 2008). Interdisciplinary and feminist research, 
which dominates the literature on U.S. overseas military bases, tends to focus on the 
negative consequences of these installations, including human trafficking, sex tourism, 
violations of sovereignty, and anti-militarism, seeing them as outlets of imperialism (e.g., 
Hughes, Chon and Ellerman 2007; Gonzalez 2007; Yeo 2010).  
Research on SEZs reflects the variability in the definitions, functions, processes, 
and outcomes of these zones. For example, Ong (2006) explores “neoliberalism as 
exception” and analyzes how our traditional understandings of citizenship and 
sovereignty is being unraveled and reconceptualized through government use of 
neoliberal ideology to advance market-based economic and technological approaches as 
development strategies (6). In SEZs, this is seen through the exclusion of citizenship for 
some populations (the poor, women, low-skilled workers) who are overregulated, and 
“graduated citizenship” of others, who are less regulated, based on race and ethnicity. 
However, the concept of neoliberalism as exception is not geographically bound but also 
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includes changing definitions, for example, of gender. Alternatively, Sklair and Robbins 
(2002) advocate a global-systems theory that, similar to the approaches by Zelizer (2005) 
and Bandelj (2002, 2009), highlights how transnational practices operate in economic, 
political, and cultural-ideological spheres that are “superimposed upon each other rather 
than separate spheres” (p. 82). Using a transnational (transcending nation-states) rather 
than an inter-national (between nation-states) approach, he uses Mexican maquiladoras 
and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone to explore the effects of export-led 
industrialization fuelled by foreign investment and technology on temporary 
urbanization, the emergence of new classes who benefit from the creation of these zones, 
and how they influence the ways that capitalism is integrated within countries (Sklair 
1991, 1992).  
Global borderlands’ spatiality is an important characteristic, as is the focus on 
social and cultural exchanges and not just labor and other types of economic exchanges. 
In contrast to Ong, my analytic approach is not limited to the Western, neoliberal 
economic and political influence but highlights specific cultural understandings, 
historical connections and institutions that structure the varied forms of interaction within 
these spaces; additionally I use the term nationality as opposed to the concept of 
citizenship, since regulations are based on a continuum and differ according to the 
aforementioned forms of interaction between countries that are shaped by history, 
culture, and institutions. Though this approach is similar to Sklair’s, it differs in that I 
analyze specific between-country relationships, not transnational processes, to explore 
the varied cultural understandings, historical connections, and social structures of and 
between local and foreign visitors and workers.  
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To examine how inequality relates to social structures, locals’ and visitors’ 
cultural understandings of the zone, and the historical macro relationships between 
various countries, I focus specifically on work practices and discourses through a case 
study of the Harbor Point mall (HP) in the SBFZ, which opened in April 2012; 
newspaper analysis of Korean-owned Hanjin Shipping, an SBFZ shipping and 
manufacturing company; and a document- and interview-based examination of the former 
U.S. military base. I also examine locals’ perceptions of Americans and Koreans to 
illustrate how state-to-state relations influence and are influenced by micro-interactions. 
First, it is important to note that as in many places, structural inequality underlines 
interactions between workers and consumers, as well as foreigners and visitors. For 
example, there is a significant wage differential between local workers and both local and 
foreign visitors. Wages of Harbor Point employees range from 230 to 330 Philippine 
pesos (Php). The average fast food meal in the mall costs upwards of 79 to 99 Php, 
almost one-third of their daily wage. This is in contrast to meals, including rice and 
drinks, offered at local palengke stalls that range from 30 to 65 pesos. When workers 
spoke of lunch, they talked about how they brought their lunch to work and very rarely 
ate at fast food or other restaurants in the mall because of the price. Eating “out” is a 
luxury workers can rarely afford, reserved for special occasions or for payday. Contrast 
this with a self-employed Filipino businessman, a consultant and advisor to the SBMA, 
whom I saw nearly everyday at a coffee shop inside HP; sometimes he would read a 
paper and drink coffee, while at other times he conducted business meetings, treated 
colleagues to merienda (snacks) and used the coffee shop as a work space. His salary was 
100,000 Php per month. Calculating workers’ monthly salary using a six-day workweek, 
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workers’ monthly salaries are 6% (5,520Php) to 8% (7,920Php) of his. Similarly, 
compared to American military salaries, which ranged from $1,000 ($600 in cash, $400 
towards bills through allotments) every two weeks to $80,000 per year and others’ 
salaries–including an American “sexpat” (a term used by a Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) 
to describe a sex tourist) whose annual salary ranged from $20,000 to $60,000 depending 
on the year and a British businessman who did not want to disclose his salary but said it 
was “a range. Quite a lot,” these workers’ salaries are extremely low–though PCV’s 
salaries are comparable at 150Php per day and missionaries raise their own money before 
they embark on their trip.  
The meanings of work within the SBFZ are complex and depend on the social 
position that individuals occupy. For example, despite the wide gap in pay between 
themselves and foreigners, Filipino mall employees prefer to work inside the SBFZ rather 
than outside because minimum wage rules are regulated and enforced, workers are 
eligible for social security benefits, and employment is more stable and available. Like 
other types of immigrants who migrate within-country or internationally, they occupy a 
privileged social position when compared to workers outside the SBFZ and to their 
families. Interviewees were often the family breadwinners, sending remittances to family 
members in the province if they lived in a boarding house nearby, or paying for a 
substantial amount of their families’ housing and living costs, often giving half of each 
paycheck to the head of their household. 
Furthermore, when we look at interactions between different groups of workers, 
employers and consumers, meanings about one another take varied forms based on 
historical and contemporary meso (organizational)- and macro-relationships between 
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nation-states. These broader relationships are filtered through everyday interactions, 
which both directly influence and are influenced by the macro ties between nation-states. 
Here, I analyze Philippine-American and Philippine-Korean relationships through work 
and consumption practices and the associated moral discourses.  
Locals’ perceptions of Americans 
 According to Harbor Point mall employees, Americans are “friendly” and treated 
workers “good” and with “more respect” than even Filipino visitors who were “stuck up” 
reflecting the class-based workings of Philippine society. Local visitors who used to work 
at the former base also expressed this sentiment. For example, Maria says:  
I worked with Americans before, they were my employer. So in comparison, with the 
salary and their treatment, Americans are better. They gave us all the benefits and treat 
their employees right. Although there are some Americans who doesn’t treat their 
workers well, it’s not all of them. I once had a supervisor that was biased against 
Filipinos, but the rest, they were all kind people. Actually, I was given an A or an 
outstanding rate by our superintendent for three years…he appreciated my work. So 
when the time came that they left, it felt sad. We actually didn’t want to leave. We visited 
the US counter facility before [they left]. We gathered the staff and reminisced about 
everything…We miss our co-workers that are now living abroad. They returned to the 
Philippines once and we had a reunion...In comparison to those new workers, they’re not 
satisfied with their salaries now. Their salaries are not enough for them. Not enough to 
feed their family. Unlike before, we had bonuses every December that were really high. 
Americans were good employers. (This is the English translation, see author for Tagalog 
version) 
 
Roberto, a Filipino SBFZ visitor who grew up alongside the former military base because 
his mother and father worked there, told me of his fear that locals would not maintain the 
Americanized culture of the SBFZ: 
Maybe what I generally fear is having Harbor Point [mall], [there are] a lot more people 
who aren’t from here, you know? Because if you’re from Olongapo or Subic, you know. 
Everyone knows everyone basically if you’re from here. But now, there’s so many new 
faces. You don’t know right away, who they are. First, you just think, oh no, they’re not 
from here?! So what I fear is over population since there’s a lot of visitors that don’t know, 
in general, the rules and regulations here. I fear that the discipline inside here will vanish. 
Because of course, some other people throw their waste or garbage in random places. But 
us, generally, we're not like that. We don't spit on the floor. Normally we don't do that … I 
just want to maintain our culture, which was Americanized.  
 
Global borderlands 
 38
 These understandings of Americans are shaped by the broader American-Philippine 
“special relationship” that originated in colonialism and continues through today’s era of 
visiting military forces, as well as unequal import and export markets, and the 
Philippines’ continued dependence on the U.S. for millions of dollars in nonmilitary and 
military aid. In Olongapo City, while the base was operational, the U.S. military was the 
second largest employer in the Philippines, pumping an estimated $500 million each year 
into the local economies of Olongapo and Angeles (site of Clark Air Force Base). More 
than 80,000 people in Central Luzon made their living from the bases (United States 
102nd Congress 1992). SBNB also had a four-year apprenticeship program for Filipino 
college graduates, and during the Vietnam War, the Aetas (one of the Philippines’ 
indigenous peoples) of Subic trained troops in jungle survival skills (e.g. United States 
1986).  
 Because of the large number of both American and Filipino veterans of the U.S. 
military, the only U.S. Veterans Affairs office outside the U.S. is located in the 
Philippines. However, U.S. and R.P. legal cases also show that many former base 
employees have sued the U.S. military to receive retirement benefits. These cases were 
adjudicated in favor of the U.S. military because of the Filipinos’ work was classified as 
temporary or non-entitled. So although there is nostalgia for the return of the base–
something that is in the works but on a much smaller scale–the nostalgia does not cover 
or erase the wrongs omitted by the U.S. military. The relationship between the U.S. and 
R.P. is complex, rooted in a colonialism that ruled “benevolently” through local elites and 
continued inequality, but is also rooted through a nostalgia and good will on the part of 
former Subic Bay base workers and manipulation of Filipino elites of American policies.  
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 Local perceptions of Koreans 
It is also important to understand broader South Korean and Philippine relations 
because they serve as a foundation for Filipinos’ perceptions of Koreans and comparisons 
between Koreans and Americans. Beverley drew this contrast between Americans and 
Koreans: “Yeah, they kwan, they treat Filipinos like, as slave. Sabi nila ha? Hindi kwan, 
hindi tao. Sabi ha? Like in Hanjin. ‘Di ba totoo ‘yun, ‘di ba? Like in Hanjin.” [Yeah, they 
treat Filipinos like slaves. What did they say? That we’re not people. Like in Hanjin [a 
Korean-owned shipping businesses within the SBFZ]]. Current HP workers agree with 
this differentiation of customers based on nationality. While Americans are “friendly” 
and “treat workers with respect,” Korean customers are rude and treat the workers poorly. 
Mark noted that his Korean friends weren’t sociable and didn’t seek his advice, like his 
American friends did; whereas Juanita didn’t have any Korean friends, because she 
doesn’t find them approachable.  
This perception of Koreans by Filipinos does not occur in a vacuum but rather is 
shaped by the underlying Philippine-Korean relationship. Broadly speaking, the 
Philippines and South Korea have strong economic and social ties, and the Philippines is 
a popular and relatively cheap place for people from Asian countries to learn English.17 
                                                 
17
 In 2011 South Korea was the fifth largest market for Philippine exports, comprising of 7.66% 
(3,701,459,904) of the total share and also the fifth largest supplier of imports consisting of 7.31% of the 
total share (4,419,530,490) while in 2009 there were 497,936 Korean visitors to the Philippines 
(Department of Trade & Industry Philippines. 2011a. “Top 10 Markets of Philippine Merchandise 
Exports,” accessed July 15, 2013, www.dti.gov.ph/dti/index.php?p=697 Department of Trade & Industry 
Philippines. 2011b. “Top 10 Suppliers of Philippine Merchandise Imports,” accessed July 15, 2013, 
www.dti.gov.ph/dti/index.php?p=697, Department of Tourism Philippines. 2009. “Arrivals by Region,” 
accessed July 15, 2013, 
http://www.visitmyphilippines.com/index.php?title=VisitorStatistics&func=all&pid=39&tbl=1). In 2011, 
there were 81,395 total Filipinos migrating to Korea (9,127 permanent, 60,268 temporary, 12,000 
“irregular), and 96,632 Koreans in the Philippines, 727 of which were permanent migrants and 29545 were 
students (Department of Foreign Affairs, South Korea. 2011. “Status of Overseas Koreans,” accessed July 
15, 2013, 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=232&seq
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Over the past several years, South Koreans have made up the largest share of tourists in 
the Philippines, accounting for almost one-fourth of all visitors in 2012 alone.18 However, 
Filipinos in South Korea often live in dire circumstances. South Korea continues to host 
U.S. military bases, and reports suggest that the U.S. military personnel there, as well as 
Korean businessmen, make up a large number of the clientele for Filipina women, many 
of whom are illegally recruited or trafficked to work in the “entertainment industry.” In 
2003, a Seoul district court ruled in favor of the Philippine embassy, which took three 
night club owners to court on behalf of eleven Filipinas; the court agreed that the women 
had been forced into prostitution, and ordered compensation (Korea JoongAng Daily 
2003, 2002). Additionally, Filipina marriage migrants face discrimination and domestic 
violence, and Filipino migrant workers are often invisible to broader society vis-à-vis 
government rules and regulations (e.g. Lee 2008).   
Within the SBFZ, South Koreans have a large and visible presence. In recent 
months, SBMA signed an agreement for a 20 billion Php resort project with Korean-
owned Resom Resort and a memorandum of understanding with Daejeon TechnoPark, 
the “second biggest center of Administration and Science and Technology” in Korea.19 
The most recent SBMA statistics say that 13% (119) of all sole-owned businesses (those 
that are not partially owned with Filipinos) are South Korean, and Hanjin Shipping is one 
                                                                                                                                                 
no=334627&c=&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_DATABOARD&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&
du=  (in Korean, translation for webpage and excel sheet by Google Translate), Philippine Overseas 
Employment Administration. 2009. “Stock Estimates of Filipinos Overseas (Inter-Agency Report),” 
accessed July 15, 2013, www.poea.gov.ph/stats/statistics.html ). 
18
 In 2012 over 1,031,155 South Koreans visitors (24.13% of all visitors) traveled to the Philippines 
(Department of Tourism, Philippines. 2012. “Visitor Arrivals to the Philippines Reached Record-High 4.3 
Million in 2012,” accessed July 15, 2013, 
http://www.visitmyphilippines.com/images/ads/681e231e0a5d37d2e5b7090b7db5d8c1.pdf ). 
19
 Subic Examiner. 2013. “SBMA, Resom Sign P20-Billion Tourism Project,” accessed July 15, 2013, 
http://www.subic-examiner.com/zxcvbnm/index.php/subic-bay-freeport-zone/228-sbma-resom-sign-p20-
billion-tourism-project; Subic Examiner. 2012. “SBMA Signs MOU with Korea’s Silicon Valley,” 
accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.subic-examiner.com/zxcvbnm/index.php/subic-bay-freeport-zone/75-
sbma-signs-mou-with-korea-s-silicon-valley 
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of the largest employers in the SBFZ (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority 2012). 
However, as Beverley indicates, Hanjin Shipping is also associated with workers’ rights 
violations, including abuse, mistreatment, lack of meal breaks, and sickness and death 
due to accidents; these violations have resulted in complaints to the SBMA, worker 
protests, and a recent memorandum of agreement with the Philippines’ Department of 
Labor and Employment (DOLE), which will now conduct regular inspection of SBFZ 
businesses.20 One case regarding two workers who were allegedly illegally dismissed 
made it to the Philippine Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld a local ruling that the 
workers “are entitled to reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority 
rights and payment of full back wages, inclusive of allowances, from the time their 
compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement” 
(Philippines 2011 p. 16-17). Rosa,21  a local visitor who used to work for a Korean 
company inside the FZ, told me her own story of how Koreans treated Filipinos like they 
were not tao (people), saying that it was not uncommon for the Koreans to physically hit 
or assault employees. 
The perception of Filipinos’ interactions with Americans and Koreans are shaped 
not only by individual social position (worker/consumer, military/civilian, rich/poor, 
foreign/local) but also both by the organizational happenings within the SBFZ, vis-à-vis 
the former U.S. military base and Hanjin shipping–whose human rights violations 
reverberate throughout the community–and through the historical and contemporary 
connections between the two countries. These broader associations are filtered through 
                                                 
20
 Torres, Estrella. 2012. “DOLE, SBMA Sign Deal to Protect Subic Freeport Workers” BusinessMirror, 
accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/index.php/en/news/regions/6603-dole-
sbma-sign-deal-to-protect-subic-freeport-workers 
21
 Pseudonyms are given to all interviewees  
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everyday interactions, and global borderlands provide an ideal case to analyze such 
interactions because they are concentrated, geographically bounded centers geared 
toward this type of international exchange, and these dealings directly and indirectly 
influence and are influenced by micro-, meso-, and macro-level relationships.  
Conclusion 
This paper introduces the concept of “global borderlands” to identify new 
globalized and analytic spaces that are semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled geographic 
locations geared toward international exchange. It thus extends the rich literature on 
global cities and traditional borderlands by showing the significance of these foreign-
controlled spaces. It also highlights how or state-to-state relationships–not only an 
individual country’s place in a world-system– directly and indirectly influence and are 
influenced by micro-interactions.  
Global borderlands share three features: semi-autonomy, geographic and 
symbolic boundaries, and unequal relations. Although, separately, these characteristics 
are commonplace, in global borderlands they interact in spaces of unequal power and are 
influenced by state-to-state relations. The case of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, 
Philippines illustrates how global borderlands work. I show the fluidity of semi-
sovereignty and foreign-control. Even when formal agreements are made to regulate 
military personnel, the ambiguous wording of these agreements allows for power and 
pressure to influence everyday decisions and actions. Additionally, territorial space and 
the actions that occur within or outside them are subject to important negotiations 
between countries.  
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Second, I show that the geographic and symbolic boundaries that differentiate the 
SBFZ from Olongapo City take the form of visual representations and historical legacies 
of the U.S. military, and are associated with everyday moral discourses and cultural 
practices. Finally, the case of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone illustrates how semi-
autonomy and geographic and symbolic boundaries further structures unequal relations 
that occur within this setting. Here, I lay the foundation of inequality vis-à-vis the 
unequal structure of wages, comparing Harbor Point mall employee salaries with those of 
local visitors, foreign visitors, and the workers’ families. Additionally, I outline how 
macro Philippine-U.S. and Philippine-Korean state relations are filtered through everyday 
interactions and perceptions.  
Because the focus is on historical, localized context, a key limitation of the global 
borderlands concept is not being able to link workers’, local visitors’ and foreign visitors’ 
experiences as easily as, for example, a world-systems theory that focuses on 
exploitation. Additionally, although a global borderlands perspective can take into 
account the profit that organizations and corporations extract from these spaces, that is is 
not what I emphasize. Rather, I concentrate on how, for example, workers’ wages, 
interactions, and perceptions of daily life influence and are influenced by broader macro 
state to state relationships.  
Although this article is based on a single case study, it is intended to be a 
launching point for understanding the dynamics that occur in other semi-autonomous and 
foreign-controlled spaces. Future research should refine and expand this framework by 
analyzing how these processes vary across time, national location (e.g., within a country 
in the North America, West Africa, Eastern Europe), institutional context (e.g., 
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international branch campus, embassy, current military base, all-inclusive timeshare), and 
history (e.g., history of relations between countries of origin and destination, and local 
histories). Scholars should also explore the networked nature of global borderlands, and 
the varying global connections that occur based on institutional context.  
Global borderlands, including military bases, tourist resorts, special economic 
zones, international branch campuses, embassies, and headquarters of international 
organizations are new analytic spaces where we can find and examine globalization 
processes. In this way, relevant research can be subsumed into a unifying theoretical 
perspective that pays close attention to how semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled places 
reinforce, interact, and reproduce unequal interactions among different groups, as well as 
how these interactions relate to boundary-making between places and people.  
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